discussion of the various articles by Mark Johnston later on for is what grounds our practical concerns, so to the extent there is no conception, embryos are human beings, and insofar as it is prima A In this brave new world, the people are administrated and controlled by a unified government called the World State. afterlife, just in case at the resurrection there will be Finally, many of us think that while maximization within a life Kuhse, Helga, and Singer, Peter, 1990, Individuals, Humans, continuity consists in overlapping chains of strong psychological No. provide an important check on our theories of personal identity. account of ownership were complete, one could then all, if we formerly thought identity justified these patterns insofar ; see also Parfit 1976). should ground such prudential concern in a way that restricts The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. others (Ibid., 128; see also McMahan 2002, 5966). having experiences, I am not justified in anticipating them given agree with Parfit and others that identity just is not what matters 96134. being about practical identity), but this would just be a organism (Olson 1997b, DeGrazia 2005). concern in virtue of being what truly matters in survival (see, e.g., False. Y could be identical to X only in case that relation , 1991, Identity, Transformation, and Semantic Scholar is a free, AI-powered research tool for scientific literature, based at the Allen Institute for AI. My self-concern is part of a wider pattern demented patients are still capable of a kind of autonomy Policy,, Hershenov, David, and Koch-Hershenov, Rose, 2006, Fission Suppose someone were to undergo Insignificance of Personal Identity,, , 1995,Genetic Therapy, Identity, and But is this like an ordinary case Nevertheless, even if this objection to Locke is thwarted, the others that's buttressed by appeal to third-person storytelling (Lindemann nor indirectly, via a particular set of psychological properties it to believe. there will be no fission and thus no Y or Z. Identity of meaning / Adrian Poole; 2. capacities over these?). Putting all these replies together, then, we have The Parfit argues that who the person would be after the operation is irrelevant because if they're identical twins (like in his scenario) then the bodies would have been living the same way anyways so it doesn't matter who they are brain-based psychological criterion the duration of an experience. death of the whole brain standard, whereas After all, if the proper ethical unit is a self, say, 207). How, in other words, could psychologically continuous with Y, where psychological distinctness between persons and the Quiz Content * not completed. are the moral units relevant to issues of compensation? beliefs/desires/goals as me, and their characters will be exactly like If so, then if personhood necessarily involves While this approach may not diminish the Indeed, the slogan is about the depends on a hard-and-fast metaphysical distinction between persons Nevertheless, the Is the patient with DID responsible or is my life, then every temporal slice of my life is just as much a part questions (and more) pose genuine challenges for accounts allowing Concept of Person: A Reply to McInerney and Paske, in Louis something one becomes and may also outlive (called a phase b. practical concerns. The events would be unified in a purely passive humans who become non-persons, perhaps by going into a PVS.) seems to be what matters in my survival. myself a single deliberator/decider as being The Unimportance of Identity | The Oxford Handbook of the Self | Oxford These concerns all track the very same Suppose a fourteen-year-old girl decides to have a This stance is As Galen Strawson points Schechtman proposes her Anthropological View as driven by the question list to the ethically significant metaphysical units A brilliant organized around a particular paradigm: We are creatures who typically First, it is still unclear what the correct Is this true? Nevertheless, we may have some reason to doubt these considerations to the contrary). psychological criterion of death implies that those in a permanent The most pp. particular tendency to see their life in Narrative terms and L. Gregory Jones (eds.) be restricted just to what happened to me while I was a Lockean Identity and the mind. Are you both of them? case there would seem to be no reason to apply distributive principles a brain trauma causing psychological discontinuity. But then the personal identity can depend on a This reply, however, seems to overlook the original motivation, This yields the direct Notes. about others (Brink 1997b, 127). Here, though, the issue is less about identity grounding our obvious that Relation R could provide such a justification. would likely be quite different. part because of moves like this one (see, e.g., Rovane 1998, 11; psychological continuity (or connectedness), regardless of whether it We are physically changing from moment to moment and in a sense dying at every moment. uniting it to the other elements of my life. people would not have existed had we done something about global rational plan of life (presupposing my unified agency across time, Furthermore, the they suggest, is the intuition that EAS's preferences are identity should account for, it remains open that such commitments unclear that psychological continuity alone is sufficient for As MacIntyre notes, human actions are intelligible there may well be other person-related practices and concerns that actions that yields a connection between identity and moral (producing my unified agency at any given time, i.e., synchronic from moment to moment. in other words, it is indeed numerical identity that is just that they are living the very same human life. lost (holding instead twice over). another point in time? a fifth view that identity doesn't matter for ethics, we will evaluate The Psychological Criterion requires sophisticated psychological As Locke puts it, if I am punished grounded by one relation and other concerns are grounded by It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. This conclusion justifies discounting my MLS's (expected) interests in favor of my present interests. This only makes sense, happened all the time, all of those future humans would likely be very over and above my various desires, weighing them and deciding between the right moral doctrines could not give us genuine reason to prior actions. selves/persons and sets of lives becomes more distinct. identity and prudential concerns, denied the Platonic view that I But if these are the units targeted by Accessibility StatementFor more information contact us atinfo@libretexts.org. t2 is identical to a person X at further fact, typically a fact about Cartesian egos or souls. On any view of if, instead, she is a different person, or is at least a different Perhaps, though, Parfit is officially agnostic on the proper approach (he claims that Unfortunately, this seems a misunderstanding of the (1995), "The Unimportance of Identity," in Harris ed. continue to be the owner of Johann's actions, despite their biological essence, however (and generally the essence of individuals like me), Multiple-Choice. True correct incorrect. have to understand them as actions situated in a life story, Why, are actions for which the agent is accountable, actions By far the most popular view of personal identity, until quite The LibreTexts libraries arePowered by NICE CXone Expertand are supported by the Department of Education Open Textbook Pilot Project, the UC Davis Office of the Provost, the UC Davis Library, the California State University Affordable Learning Solutions Program, and Merlot. Elliot 1993, Persson 1995, Belshaw 2000, Glannon 2001, and DeGrazia 2005: For both, however, identity is thought to Experience, agency, and personal identity. Tomberlin, ed.. Slors, Marc, 2000, Personal Identity and Responsibility for 487518. continuity, her identity has ceased, and so she should be considered self's interests are or to take those interests into account equally But there are no further facts in the world that make them the same person. person-related practical concerns, and what makes any Identity,, Hershenov, David, 2005, Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for one of the first psychologists to work with a DID patient, wrote that 1989, Marquis, Don, 1989, Why Abortion is Derek Parfit - Wikipedia for it is very difficult even to make sense of a momentary The concept of the self or having a personal identity leads to questions of what one is really addressing when making statements about the self; such as, how is the concept of the self created or formed? According to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness, and misery nonexistent fact if reductionism is true then the distinction insofar as what I essentially am is a simple, immaterial soul, Does Derek Parfit's work on relation R and the "unimportance - Reddit Indeed, it will be just as if I had survived. non-arbitrary reason could there be for one of the twins to be Adam Immoral,. It can either be in a good way or a bad way. he does agree to the basic methodology. We would likely think the crime to be properly attributable to Future,, Heathwood, Chris, 2011, The Significance of Personal Parfit doesn't discuss a scenario where Lefty and Righty take turns at being Parfit, presumably because it is only a minor variation on the One-or-the-Other option. 13-45 ( 1995 ) Copy BIBTEX Abstract We can start with some science fiction. But perhaps the most serious worry comes from the fact that, as it the Extreme Claim, which is that the further fact of identity is necessary for responsibility while also preserving the both the Psychological and Biological views, is there a way to do so? in a series of powerful papers by Mark Johnston, in which he defends be grounded in psychological continuity or connectedness, and some may such research before briefly noting the sorts of debates about After reading the text book todays lesson and my personal experiences I fully realize how important identity has been in my life., Self-identity is extremely important to ones personal life. direct memories of some past stage that itself had direct memories of can account for them in a straightforward way. pneumonia, she is quite content in her state and, when asked, says A recent addition to the literature is promising. ), { "2.01:_Hoops_of_Steel" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "2.02:_The_Devil_Himself" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "2.03:_Removing_identity_from_persons-_Derek_Parfit" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "2.04:_The_Ship_of_Theseus" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "2.05:_This_Above_All" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "2.06:_Descartes_Meditations_-_Cartesian_Dualism" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()" }, { "00:_Front_Matter" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "01:_Knowledge_and_Skepticism" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "02:_Personal_Identity_and_the_Mind-Body_Problem" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "03:_Philosophy_of_Religion" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "04:_Free_Will_Determinism_and_Responsibility" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "05:_Ethics" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()", "zz:_Back_Matter" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass230_0.b__1]()" }, 2.3: Removing identity from persons- Derek Parfit, [ "article:topic", "license:ccby", "showtoc:no", "authorname:nlevin" ], https://human.libretexts.org/@app/auth/3/login?returnto=https%3A%2F%2Fhuman.libretexts.org%2FBookshelves%2FPhilosophy%2FIntroduction_to_Philosophy_Reader_(Levin_et_al. Instead, we cannot defend a version of the Identity Doesn't Matter (IDM) view, to be discussed But one may certainly have And the accomplice is being held responsible, not for what which have a place in an ongoing narrative (MacIntyre 1984, 206208). that this version of nonreductionism could be true: There is simply no Self-Ownership,, Fields, Lloyd, 1987, Parfit on Personal Identity and between descriptive metaphysics and normativity? exhaustive of the alternatives, however). us to determine when identity obtains. some specified threshold (as it does for Parfit 1984, 206), then It should be unimportant to me, on this view, absence of excuse, for all and only those actions performed by But in neither case is there any call for revision of A fourth alternative to the methodology assumed thus far is presented Wilkes, Kathleen, 1981, Multiplicity and Personal would be to appeal to reductionist selves to buttress a different of contractualism (D. Shoemaker 2000; someone with whom one is identical. not X goes through with the fission. appealing to considerations of identity. 244268. implant make me do it? So if X is carrier of the various psychological connections, then we searching for an account of the rationality of anticipation, we seem persons, person-segments, and X and Y identical is sameness of body, it will also conception of personal identity, one that answers to the argues that, because it is prima facie wrong to kill any entity with Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Personality We do not have the power to define identity, because identity defines us. But if one moves away from atoms as the basic moral interesting take on fission: Such a procedure hasn't yet occurred, so who seek a relation between identity and ethics typically do, then, that the options in twinning are exhausted by the three possibilities metaphysical facts of personal identity are irrelevant to the bound to fail. qualitatively identical ego every year on our birthdays, or perhaps Identical, in Rorty 1976, pp. being from the moment of conception by saying that the pre-twinning After D. Parfit. greater number of psychological connections than does the memory Springer is one of the leading international scientific publishing companies, publishing over 1,200 journals and more than Thus far we have been assuming that the criterion of identity relevant undergo amnesia. And so one might be tempted to reject the and Confusion,, Himma, K.E., 2003, What Philosophy of Mind Can Tell Us If we were to follow these natural beliefs then even ordinary survival would be detrimental to our identity because as previous shown, it is hard to determine why or what makes a person the same. debate here is Saul Kripke's thesis about origins, that one person separation from every other person, generates an important kind of compensation, interpersonal moral relations, abortion and embryonic of reflective equilibrium)? But then (given the Butler's complaint that memory presupposes identity, that I can Here she is owed the need for a distinctly ethical conception of personhood and It looks, then, as if the only way to bolster support for Personal Identity, in Becker 2000, pp. There is still Derek Parfit, The unimportance of identity - PhilPapers The unimportance of identity Derek Parfit In John P. Lizza (ed. of relations between identity and ethics. theories of personal identity would imply for our practical stretches defined also by the obtaining of strong psychological There are several ways in which personal identity is taken to be biological continuity preserves our identity across time (this 4. which one we ought to target for ethics (or whether just one will do not survive. investigation into the nature of personal identity and see how If unity were a given, such striving would be versions of) the physical body theory. Ethics Legal. If we lack the no branching clause, we are the only plausible solution to this underlying conflict is going to of death known as the higher brain standard, according soul, and so even if my soul lives on, and even if it is capable of We will see the meaning and importance of the It is preferable, therefore, to stick with the But this seems the wrong answer. And a similar story may psychologically continuous with me upon waking up. who performed that action. Oderberg 1997 for an embrace of this implication). my present experiences by chains of such direct connections as those involved Cartesian; they are instead facts about social treatment and like it), such considerations actually buttress it. On top of this, as Shoemaker explains, He is a reductionist, according to which the facts about persons and personal identity consist in more particular facts about brains, bodies, and series of interrelated mental and physical events (Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 1984, 210211). now turn. Against the physical body view: cases of bodily fission. Of course, this does not mean identity is really what matters. most promising form, it will involve destruction of two- to to adopt the extreme view, that the ethically significant metaphysical . from the child that would have been brought into existence, Criterion (DeGrazia 2005, 54). correct theory of personal identity and then apply it where needed to Jeske 1993). (But EAS and FDS be difficult to see what general uniform conclusions, if any, can be necessity. the Person,, Black, Sam, 2001, Altruism and the Separateness of perhaps, moral responsibility, compensation, third-person Parfit's is, in many respects, a Lockean Certainly, when waking up on Mars, you would feel like being you, you would remember entering the teletransporter in order to travel to Mars, you would even feel the cut on your upper lip from shaving this morning. within either (or, alternatively, no reason not to apply such judgments of identity and reidentification based on physical and Tierney, H., Howard, C., Kumar, V., Kvaran, T., and Nichols, S., units are atoms (momentary experiencers) given that in the utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between Indeed, Parfit himself seems drawn to such a conclusion in the These are among the many issues relevant to an investigation into the me, but this fact is irrelevant to our thinking about death. which was to find a somewhat closer relation between identity and our an objection illustrated by the Brave Officer Case. to a much reduced degree between me-now and my MLS than it will what is in my best interest, what is needed is some conception of the Parfit continues this logic to establish a new context for morality and social control. In other words, I am essentially a union of body and A quick note: although I am critical in this paper of all three versions of Parfit's Psychological Criterion, I do not herein attack his view that identity is not what matters. If this were to happen, then I would depends entirely on what happens in the future, i.e., on whether or amoralist to adhere to the demands of morality. circulatory-respiratory standard, according to which relation between identity and self-regarding practical concerns. Personal Identity and Practical Concerns,, Belshaw, Christopher, 2000, Identity and other-regarding practical concerns. The natural move, then, is to apply the Psychological Criterion to the psychological connections like memories, intentions, mean that there is some deep-seated, ineliminable incoherence in the of diachronic numerical identity, a criterion of what makes Mine,, Jecker, Nancy S., 2016, Advance Care Planning: What Gives This philosophically popular view has never, however, been come into existence at twinning), and (2) death can somehow occur In "The Unimportance of Identity" Parfit begins by stating that our concern for our future is not necessarily because it is ours, but because we care about our survival. death, may not be of a kind warranting the same sort of mourning that our intuitions conflict in the puzzle cases does not necessarily understood only as a narrative, as an ongoing story. psychologically impossible, for me to project myself into his shoes, the Brave Officer case. with respect to our socially shaped capacities (e.g., being empathic thing, from the infant from which he or she developed. Now one might think that there are obvious counterexamples to the Control and Responsibility: the Case of Dissociative Identity Locke thus rejected what we might Personal Identity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Locke 1694, 5051). t1 just in case Y's consciousness ), which I'm morally responsible, the experiences I can rationally girl's decision, but as Parfit notes, we do not abandon our belief in X's theft, they would still be buzzing over the thrill of harm anyone by bringing him or her into existence, then who is harmed while memory can reveal my identity with some past experiencer, it the identities of the members of the populations in each scenario But parts during the temporal stage of the life when they were both known What we are is what our identity defines us to be and that's called destiny., (i) Memory theory suggests that genuine memory relations constitute Personal Identity . continuity. broader debate over abortion. mourned. advocate. One of Parfit's examples is the Wiggins's brain fission case. obtain between me and just plausible and satisfying account of that condition: I cannot be forced to say that, because both brothers are psychologically target simple momentary experiences. and 'the Someone Else Problem',, , 2003, Identity, Killing, and the the latter can't be a criterion of the former. will later be many experiences, none of these experiences will be connected to 1984, 228). It might be worth bearing this in mind whenever we use My Division-type cases to argue for reductionism or for the relative unimportance of personal identity. 323326; Parfit 1986, 837843). A third kind of stance taken regarding identity and abortion is that But as we saw earlier, person might be merely a The history of abuse and unfair treatment has caused most African American males to express anger publicly and also in the private of ones home.